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The Decline of Marginal Districts in Congressional Elections
Dan Zimmerman
Department of Political Science, Chapman University; Orange, California
Introduction to Research
Back in the late 1950’s to the early 1970’s many
political scientists began to notice a decline of
competitive elections in many Congressional districts.
The phenomenon was first documented by a Yale
Professor by the name of David Mayhew when he
originally wrote that “the House seat swing is a
phenomenon of fast declining amplitude and therefore of
fast declining significance” (1974), when he first noticed
the enormous number of districts with close House
elections had dropped precipitously. This initial discovery
lead to a long line of further research in an attempt to
discover what was causing such low cases of
competitive elections and such intense increases in the
number of safe districts for Congressional members.
Currently there is a multitude of proposed explanations
towards this phenomenon including the advantages
incumbents have in the reelection process,
redistricting/gerrymandering, the impact of recent
partisan polarization, the impact of campaign finance,
etc. In my investigation I will look at former research
done by former and current political scientists to discover
what is believed to be causing a decline in marginal
districts/competition in congressional elections.

Hypotheses:
H 1: It would seem that the lack of competition could potentially cause a drop in turnout rates.
H2: Incumbency advantages is the main reason for the decline in marginal districts in California.

Data
H 1: Turnout Rates: The Chart displays the decline of voter turnout between the 2010 and 2014 congressional
elections following the non-partisan redistricting implementation.

History of the Topic
Political Scientists Alan Ambramowitz, Brad Alexander, and
Matthew Gunning came up with three hypotheses to in an
attempt to explain the steep decline in marginal districts in
congressional elections, the redistricting, partisan
polarization, and incumbency hypotheses. The redistricting
hypothesis states that declining competition is due mainly to
the effects of partisan or bipartisan gerrymandering
(basically legislatures are using technology to redraw
congressional district lines). If this hypothesis were to be
correct, than there should be a substantial increase in the
number of safe districts and a decrease in the number of
marginal districts in results from the elections in 1982, 1992,
and 2002. The partisan polarization hypothesis argues that
that the decline is not due to partisan gerrymandering, but
simply that Democratic districts have become more
Democratic, and Republican districts have become more
Republican. The hypothesis also claims that marginal
districts are disappearing as a result of powerful forces in
American society such as internal migration, immigration,
and ideological realignment within the electorate. The
incumbency hypothesis states that the decline in
competition is due less to change in the partisan
composition of House districts than to the growing
advantages of the incumbency. The incumbent hold two
types of advantages: those that derive from holding office,
and campaign-related advantages. Looking at the data, the
authors found strong support for both the partisan
polarization, and incumbency hypotheses, however very
little support for the redistricting hypothesis.

Findings
H 1: Turnout Rates:
As expected the data set which came from the
California Secretary of State, displayed that in the
majority of districts voter turnout plummeted from
the 2010 to 2014 congressional elections. It would
indicate that the lack of competition in elections
has lead voters to stay away from the polls come
election day. For instance, District 12 where the
Incumbent Nancy Pelosi has been serving since
1987, saw a decline in voter turnout, which could
indicate that voters stayed away from the polls due
to the lack of competition to challenge incumbent,
and the lack of opportunity to make a difference in
the total vote.
H 2: Incumbency:
The charts display how disproportionate the
percentage of the incumbent vote is compared to
that of the challenger. In many districts the data
indicates that there is a lack of competition
between the incumbent of the challenger, as it
indicates there is no real danger for many
California Representatives, and that there is
currently an extreme amount of safe districts. The
data also shows that no incumbent lost a race in
both the 2010 and 2014 congressional elections,
thus showing the immense advantages the
incumbent has in re-securing their district.

Conclusions

H2: Incumbency: The following Tables display the percentage of the vote in races between the
incumbent and the challenger in both the 2010 and 2014 CA congressional elections.

j the case of the decline in marginal districts in
In
both California and the rest of the United States it
would seem that both the impact of partisan
polarization and the extreme advantages held by
the incumbent have made way for an all time high
of safe districts across the nation. There are many
explanations to why the incumbents yields so
many advantages including the ability to fund and
run a better campaign and the perks of already
serving in office. Based on these current trends it
would seem that the number of safe districts will
remain high in congressional elections and there
will remain a lack of true competition for
incumbents. .
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